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ABSTRACT
This Article investigates two particularly intriguing aspects of evolving
theories of intellectual property. The first is how well new theories mesh
with traditional theories. Externality theory from this decade recapitulates
public goods theory from the 1980s. Misappropriation doctrine from 1918
embodies the prescriptions of theory developed decades later. The second
is how well theories developed for copyright and patent law, the creativity
domain of IP, fit trademark law, the fraud and competition domain. This
Article demonstrates that the three approaches to determining the optimal
scope of copyright and patent protection involve a balancing of interests
equally applicable to trademark issues.
In trademark law, those interests are the creation of incentives to engage
in trademarking activity and the use of marks to lower search costs and
increase competition. Balancing these interests for any type of use of a
mark requires weighing the benefits of exclusive rights and the benefits of
free access. Courts that enjoin conduct leading to Internet initial interest
confusion tend to focus solely on goodwill, the dynamic efficiency side of
the balance. When accepting such claims, courts offer no limits on the
internalization of externalities and ignore the inherent balancing. The
mixed public goods nature of trademarks means that that the balance
between incentives and access might differ for different uses of
trademarks. A discussion of Internet initial interest confusion, sponsorship
confusion, and post-sale confusion illustrates how to perform this
balancing.
Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School.
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In the traditional perspective, intellectual property law has two
domains: the creativity domain and the fraud domain.' Copyright law and
patent law are about encouraging ideas, creativity, and enlightenment.
2
Expressions of ideas and disclosed innovations are public goods informing
the way we think and improving our lives. Trademark law is about
commerce, competition, and preventing fraud.3 Source indicators are
private goods producers use to market their goods and services. The
contrasting theoretical foundations for these two domains obscure
practical solutions to vexing trademark law issues.
This Article highlights the common foundations of copyright,
patent, and trademark law. The emerging "externalities" approach to
copyright and patent is equally applicable to benefits competitors and
consumers obtain from investments in trademarks. The market failures
associated with the non-rivalrousness and non-excludability of public
goods such as information about expressions of ideas and novel
innovations apply to many uses of source indicators. The conflict between
monopoly rights and free access inherent in misappropriation theory is as
central to understanding the protection of trademarks as it is to copyrights
and patents.
Externalities theory has recently emerged as a normative
explanation for the structure of copyright and patent law.4 External
benefits are advantages conferred on others without compensation.5 The
lack of compensation prevents those who invest in creation and innovation
from maximizing the return on their investment or knowing the full extent
of the demand for their activity. 6 Copyright and patent law define the
extent to which compensation may be required.
1 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2002) (arguing that the theoretically
distinct areas of patent and trademark law may be used in complementary ways to extend
the life of patents and enhance consumer welfare).
2 Id. at 1468.
3 Id. ("Unlike patent and copyright protection, which seek to spur the creation of
inventions and expressive works, trademark protection purports to enhance competition
among providers of goods and services.").
4 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 265
(2007) (applying externalities theory to copyright and patent law); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A
Positive Externality Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (2005) (applying the theory of externalities to copyright law); see also Alina
Ng, Copyright's Empire: Why the Law Matters, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 337
(2007) (using an externalities approach to develop an institutional and technological
analysis of copyright).
5 ADAM GIFFORD, JR. & GARY J. SANTONI, PUBLIC ECONOMICS: POLITICIANS, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, AND EXCHANGE 37 (1979).
6 See Part 11, infra.
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In articles published in 2005 and 2007, Professor Harrison 7 and
Professors Frischmann and Lemley8  applied externality theory to
copyright and patent law. They explain why intellectual property law does
not and should not compensate creators of original expressions and new
and non-obvious innovations for all of the beneficial spillovers from their
creative activity. They use externality theory to explain and justify the
limits on copyright and patent scope.
Before externality theory, the modern theoretical foundation for
copyright and patent law was public goods theory.9 Public goods are
characterized by non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability.
10
Consumption of information is non-rivalrous because one person's use
does not diminish the ability of another to benefit from the information.
Information is non-excludable because, once the information has been
disclosed, it is difficult to prevent people who have not paid for the
information from exploiting it. The policy implication of characterizing a
good as a public good is that private markets may not efficiently allocate
and encourage the production of public goods." Copyright and patent
laws are ways of addressing these market failures.
A simplistic view of the misappropriation doctrine is that people
ought not to exploit the labor of others without compensation. The goal is
to prevent people from "reaping where they have not sown," from "free-
riding" on the efforts of others. 12 For copyright and patent law, this means
protecting the author or inventor's right to enjoin others' uncompensated
use. In copyright and patent law, the exclusive right to use is
circumscribed by limiting the scope of right to defined copyrightable
elements and patentable claims, permitting fair use (in copyright), and
granting rights for finite terms.
Application of the misappropriation doctrine to copyright and
patent illustrates that some free-riding, such as that which occurs after the
term has expired, is acceptable. Acceptable free-riding is certainly
appropriation, but it is not misappropriation. This is the more nuanced
7 Harrison, supra note 4.
8 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4.
9 Reference to public goods theory is most common in the legal literature discussing
copyright issues, but is also quite familiar to those writing in patent law. For a
comprehensive list of articles using public goods theory in both areas, see David W.
Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22, 23 n.2.
(2006).
10 d.
n Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1610 (1982)
("Economists ordinarily characterize intellectual property law as an effort to cure a form
of market failure stemming from the presence of 'public goods' characteristics.").
12 Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
2007-2008
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view of misappropriation doctrine presented in the classic Supreme Court
case International News Service v. Associated Press. 
13
Trademark law's historical roots in fraud and competition law
obscure the similarities among the signals embodied in trademarks,
tangible expressions of ideas, and disclosed innovations. Trademark
infringers free ride on the investments of trademark owners and
misappropriate owners' goodwill. But competitors' fair use of another's
trademark for comparative advertising is acceptable appropriation,
desirable free-riding on another investment in information. 14 Consumers'
use of trademarks in searching for goods is non-rivalrous, non-excludable,
and desirable. These are external benefits of trademarking activity, just as
fair use and post-term use are external benefits of original expressive and
innovative activity.
Trademarks are mixed public goods. Competing proprietary
(source-indicating) uses of marks are rivalrous, but consumers' referential
uses are non-rivalrous. A trademark owner may include the cost of
trademarking in sales price and internalize some of the benefits, but
competitors and rejecting consumers never pay the price for using that
information. The public goods character of these uses of trademark
suggests that markets may not efficiently allocate resources to the
production of information about the sources and characteristics of
products and services. These similarities suggest that the theoretical
approaches to the scope of copyright and patent may fruitfully be applied
to trademark policy.
This Article combines these two theoretical perspectives and the
doctrinal perspective of the misappropriation doctrine to determine the
appropriate scope of trademark law in controversial areas. Relying on the
outlines of a misappropriation doctrine analysis, the Article considers the
extent of market failure arising from the mixed public goods nature of
trademarks and the desirability of permitting uncompensated spillovers
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that, by ignoring the benefits of comparative advertising, the district court
had given insufficient consideration to the public interest in promoting competition):
Both the FTC and the FDA encourage product comparisons. The FTC believes
that consumers gain from comparative advertising, and to make the comparison
vivid the Commission 'encourages the naming of, or reference to competitors.'
16 C.F.R. § 14, 15 (b). A 'comparison' to a mystery rival is just puffery; it is
not falsifiable and therefore is not informative. Because comparisons must be
concrete to be useful, the FDA's regulations implementing the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. § 301, prefer that the object of a
nutritional comparison be the market leader (a 'comparison' to a product
consumers do not recognize is as useless as a comparison to an anonymous
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from trademarking activity. The analytical method is focused on Internet
initial interest confusion, with passing reference to sponsorship and post-
sale confusion.
The basic challenge for intellectual property law is finding the
optimal scope of rights that simultaneously encourages creativity by
exclusive rights and permits widespread use through free access. Recent
application of the economics of externalities to copyright and patent
recommends tailoring incentives to optimize production of information at
minimum cost in terms of denial of access. Part II of this Article extends
the analysis of external effects to trademarks. Part II.A identifies those
effects of trademarking activity that are internalized while Part II.B
identifies external benefits. The existence of an external benefit is both a
practical and legal question. Some activities by their nature have only
insignificant external benefits if any. Practically speaking, the benefits of
my eating a peach are all internalized to me. Other activities are designed
to produce external benefits, such as my publishing this Article. But
whether a benefit stays "external" depends on the law, which regulates
which beneficiaries are obliged to pay for the benefits. Thus, the
classification of trademark's benefits as internal or external depends on
what uses people make of trademarks and the extent to which they are
obliged to compensate trademark owners for the benefits they receive.
Part III presents operational rules for internalizing copyright and
patent externalities and extends externality theory to trademark law. Part
III.A discusses Professor Jeffrey Harrison's externalities analysis of
copyright law and his approach to optimizing access to expressions of
ideas. It illustrates his approach and extends it to trademark law. Part
III.B discusses Professors Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley's
externalities analysis of copyright and patent law. They offer a supply and
demand perspective on externalities that readily meshes with the
traditional public goods theory of intellectual property. In their view, the
scope of IP protection is dictated by necessary incentives. Beyond that,
free access to expressive and innovative work is desirable. Part III.C
discusses irrelevant externalities, external benefits that should be ignored
when evaluating the scope of trademark protection. Trademark law would
decline to enjoin uses when doing so would not increase trademarking
activity or the benefits obtained from trademarking activity.
The traditional public goods approach to intellectual property
anticipates the descriptive and normative conclusions of externalities
theory. Part IV explains the overlap between these two approaches. It
describes the public goods nature of trademark externalities and sets the
stage for the development of a set of operational rules for determining the
optimal scope of trademark protection.
Part V offers an externalities interpretation of the Supreme Court's
seminal opinion in International News Service v. Associated Press, Inc. 15
15 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
2007-2008
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International News Service created the common law foundation for
misappropriation theory and described a theoretical basis for protecting
rights in intangible property. Part V.A describes the Supreme Court's
balancing approach in terms that reflect the operational rules derived from
externality and public goods theories. Part V.B revisits the operational
rules derived from externality and public goods theories and presents a
five-step approach to determining the optimal scope of trademark law.
Part VI applies the operational rules developed in Part V to
trademark cases in which courts rely on claims of free-riding to support
injunction. The approach is first illustrated in Part VI.A in the context of a
traditional trademark infringement case, where a competitor passes off its
goods as those of another by using the other's mark as a source indicator.
It is then applied in detail in Part VI.B to the class of cases involving
allegations of initial interest confusion on the Internet. Part VI.C briefly
considers sponsorship and post-sale confusion. Applying the operational
rules developed in this Article shows the weakest case for injunctions in
Internet initial interest confusion cases and somewhat greater support for
enjoining activity giving rise to sponsorship and post-sale confusion.
I. FREE-RIDING AND EXTERNALITIES OF TRADEMARKING ACTIVITY
We typically justify the scope of protection given to any type of
intellectual property by the benefits generated by creative expressions,
innovations, and information. The investment in productive activity alone
does not justify intellectual property monopolies; it is the fruit of the
investment that merits protection. 16 By its nature, information is
susceptible to a variety of uses by a variety of people. Whether the
benefits of information are external or internal to the creator depends on
the structure of the law.
Fully enforced, comprehensive exclusive rights theoretically
permit a creator of information to obtain the full value of all the benefits
flowing from his or her investment. By estimating those anticipated
benefits, the creator may gauge how much investment of time and
resources in the creative activity is justified. Those benefits are internal to
his or her calculus.
External benefits are derived by people who are not obliged to
compensate the creator. Because free riders produce no return on
16 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), superseded by statute, 1976
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541, as recognized in Fabrica, Inc. v. El
Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of author and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'); see
also Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9: National
and International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 313, 319 n.7 (2001)
(quoting additional sources); Harrison, supra note 4, at I n.4 (quoting other judicial
articulations of this premise).
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investment, they do not affect a rational creator's calculation of how much
to invest. Because others may use the creation without compensation,
there is no market in which they would reveal their willingness to pay for
those benefits. The creator does not and sometimes, for lack of
information, cannot take external benefits into account.
The existence of externalities suggests the potential for one market
failure: failure to provide proper incentives for creative activity. 17 This is
only a potential problem because internal benefits may be sufficient
motivation." A poet or musician may write or play to please himself or
make enough money from performances to encourage his creativity. 19 An
inventor may save so much from employing a new production process that
compensation from others who use the idea is not necessary to encourage
her investment. Professors Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman have
argued, for instance, that the structure of the fashion design industry is
such that intellectual property protection for fashions is unnecessary.
20
Then-Professor Breyer argued that the case for copyright protection for
book publishing based on incentives is weak.2' Whether there actually is
sufficient incentive in a particular industry without internalization of all
external benefits requires analysis of the industry.
External benefits may also give rise to a second market failure by
making it hard to determine the demand for creative activity. If computer
users can download music without paying, it is difficult for record
companies to know how much people are willing to pay for their
recordings. If there is no revelation of this demand, a private market does
not have the proper signals to adjust supply to demand.22
Recognition that external benefits create only the potential for
market failure is often illustrated by the example of a homeowner planting
17 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 258; Harrison, supra note 4, at 10; Ng,
supra note 4, at 3 53-54.
18 Ng, supra note 4, at 350-52, offers the example of the returns earned by J.R.R. Tolkien
for writing The Lord of the Rings series and selling fifty-two million copies, suggesting
that these internalized returns were sufficient to motivate the author. The additional $2.92
billion in revenues earned by the three movies based on the books was unnecessary to
motivate the author and, if internalized, might discourage the production of derivative
works.
'9 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 306-11 (2002) (describing
incentives available to musicians outside of copyright protection).
20 Kal Raustiala & Cristopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687 (2006).
21 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
22 See Barnes, supra note 9, at 40-43; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 279-80.
2007-2008
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flowers in his front yard.23 The flowers benefit not only the homeowner
but those walking by and those whose homes are nearby. The homeowner
may even take pleasure in the pleasure of others, "but generally the
homeowner does not seek compensation or take into account the summed
benefits for all. Neither the law nor economic efficiency require[s]
complete internalization. ' 24 But without requiring compensation, there is
no way for the homeowner to know how much benefit he is conveying on
his neighbors. There is no market to reveal the total demand for flower-
growing activity.
Limits on the scope of all intellectual property protection, which
may be broadest in trademark law, permit many users of trademarks to
enjoy the fruits of trademarking activity without paying the trademark
owner. Recognizing these positive externalities, this Article explores the
fruits of trademarking activity, the scope of protection justified by those
benefits, and the appropriate contours of trademark law.
Trademarking activity is investment in supplying source-
identifying and product-characterizing information. The fruits of
trademarking go beyond reducing the search costs of purchasers of
trademarked goods. These purchasers pay for trademarking with higher
prices. 25 Other consumers who rely on the information contained in the
23 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 939-56 (2005) (discussing public goods theory and
comparing impure public goods); Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 258; Mark A.
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1048
n.75 (2005) (discussing the perspective on intellectual property law that would permit
creators to appropriate the full social value of their creations). The simple flower garden
of the Frischmann article is a "magnificent English garden that people comes from miles
around to see." Harrison, supra note 4, at 9. See also Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop
Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?,
10 DUKE ENVT'L L. & POL'Y F. 73, 75 n.7 (1999) (discussing the environmental
commons); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public
Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 520 (2002) (discussing Demsetz theory of the allocation
of property rights); Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REv.
907, 915, 943 (2004) (discussing the allocation and management of common pool
resources and describing lack of compensation for external effects as "blinders" that do
not permit the actor to see the effects of his or her conduct); David D. Haddock, When
Are Environmental Amenities Policy-Relevant?, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 383, 412 (2004)
(discussing incentives to create environmental amenities); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal
Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income
Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 482 (1996) (discussing deductibility of personal expenditures
based on positive externalities created); F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and
Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and
Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 401 n.255 (2006) (discussing incentives to
create); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavior
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1048 (1993) (discussing gender bias
in the tax code).
24 Frischmann, supra note 23, at 967.
25 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 277 (1988):
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trademark reject the supplier's good. Competing suppliers of goods
engaged in comparative advertising 26 or in remanufacturing of goods, 27 as
well as social commentators, are encouraged or allowed to benefit from
another's trademarking activity without paying. 28 The existence of these
uncompensated positive externalities suggests, but does not by itself
prove, that mark owners will produce too little information about their
products.
Part II.A discusses internalized benefits of trademarking activity -
benefits for which the mark owner receives compensation. Part II.B
discusses currently uncompensated externalized benefits of trademarking.
The goal is to demonstrate that many people free ride on the trademark
owner's investment and to raise the question of when compensation
should be paid.
A. INTERNALIZED BENEFITS OF TRADEMARKING ACTIVITY
The obvious internalized benefit from trademarking activity is the
enhanced revenues obtained by the trademark owner and its licensees due
to increased sales. It is well-recognized that buyers benefit from
trademarking activity and pay for that activity through higher prices.
Posner and Landes sensibly observed that consumers are willing to pay
more for goods that are more likely to satisfy their needs.29 The mark
provides this assurance. I might buy five pairs of walking shoes before
finding one that is still comfortable after the first few miles. Having found
that pair, I am willing to pay more to ensure that the next pair is made by
the same supplier, as a way of avoiding the risk of wasting money on an
unsatisfactory product. Consumers gain something by paying for
assurance of higher quality. If they can rely on a mark as a consistent
The fact that two goods have the same chemical formula does not make them of
equal quality to even the most coolly rational consumer. That consumer will be
interested not in the formula but in the manufactured product and may therefore
be willing to pay a premium for greater assurance that the good will actually be
manufactured to the specifications of the formula.
26 See supra text accompanying note 14.
27 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947):
The result is, of course, that the second-hand dealer gets some advantage from
the trade mark. But under the rule of Prestonettes, Inc., v. Coty, supra, that is
wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior
qualities of the product resulting from wear and tear or the reconditioning by the
dealer. Full disclosure gives the manufacturer all the protection to which he is
entitled.
21 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the public interest in free and artistic expression greatly outweighed the
trademark owner's interest in potential consumer confusion about the owner's
sponsorship of an artist's work).
29 See Landes & Posner, supra note 25.
2007-2008
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signal of the qualities and characteristics of a good, they can save time
(reduce search costs) by looking for goods with that mark affixed.
Trademark owners can internalize the costs of trademarking
activity only if consumers are willing to pay for the product information
and quality assurance conveyed by the mark. Consumers benefit only if
they can rely on the mark as a signal that the good has the characteristics
associated with the mark. If competitors with goods of varying qualities
and characteristics can affix the same mark to their goods, consumers can
no longer rely on the mark as a signal. Concurrent competitive use of a
mark increases consumers' cost of searching for goods that satisfy their
preferences and diminishes their willingness to pay for the signals the
mark provides.
Similarly, trademarking activity informs first-time buyers by
describing the qualities and characteristics of the products. Knowing that
Extra Strength Exedrin pain reliever made by Novartis contains caffeine
30
may induce me to buy the product because I appreciate the mind-altering
effects of caffeine. Knowing that a Big Mac sold by McDonald's has two
all-beef patties and special sauce might induce me to purchase one if I
think two patties are better than one.3 1 Providing such information raises
the cost of supplying the product, which a rational seller will attempt to
pass on to customers. The rational seller will decide to produce more
information if the cost of doing so is less than the additional revenue the
seller earns. So we can expect a trademark owner to supply revenue-
maximizing information. First-time buyers, perhaps relying on the product
information revealed by trademarking activity, will purchase the goods if
the anticipated benefits exceed the price, including the passed-on cost of
trademarking activity.
2
The bottom line is that there is a market for the information
produced by trademarking activity. Successful trademark owners cover the
cost of their trademarking activity through higher prices charged to
purchasers of their goods. Purchasers are willing to pay for the benefit
trademarking activity provides when making their purchasing decisions.
30 See http://www.excedrin.com/products/.
31 One might also want to know that a Big Mac contains 1040 milligrams of salt (most in
the bun and the grill seasoning) and twenty-nine grams of fat. See
http://app.mcdonalds.com/bagamcmeal. One might also want to know the health
implications. This type of information is unlikely to be forthcoming even if McDonald's
had more revenue with which to supply the information. Professor Goodman reports that
companies did not widely disclose nutritional information until federal regulation
required it. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV.
83, 139 (2006) (citing MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE 77-84, 101-03
(2002) (describing the evolution of the federal nutrition labeling requirement)).
32 The higher price resulting from increased trademarking activity is not pure profit for
the supplier. Some portion of that revenue goes to paying for the cost of providing
information about its product and strengthening the link between its product and its mark
as indicating the origin of the product. Novartis and McDonalds pay for advertising the
qualities and characteristics of their products and for maintaining consistent quality.
11
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Those benefits are internalized to the supplier's production decisions
because the supplier is compensated for providing that information.
The trademark information market is not, however, a perfect
market. Purchasers are not the only parties that benefit from the
trademarking activity by making referential use of the mark. People who
refer to the information provided by the trademark owner and decline to
buy the good, people who use the mark to refer to the good (and implicitly
its characteristics and qualities) in conversation, and people who engage in
comparative advertising or social commentary benefit without paying.
These uncompensated benefits are external to the trademark owner's
decision-making.
B. EXTERNALIZED BENEFITS OF TRADEMARKING ACTIVITY
Many, perhaps most, referential users of trademarks free ride on
the trademark owner's investment. Referential users of a mark do not use
the mark to indicate that they are the source of goods to which the mark is
affixed. Rather, they use the mark to refer to the goods of the trademark
owner. Referential users stand in contrast to proprietary users, those who
use the mark to indicate that they are the source of the goods to which the
mark is affixed. Traditional infringement cases involve competitors whose
proprietary use of another's mark deceives or confuses consumers about
the source of the goods. Referential use is generally permitted.
Consumers who reject a good or service based on the source or
characteristics and qualities information conveyed by the mark benefit
from the owner's trademarking activity without paying. The owner's
investments inform rejecting consumers that the good will not meet their
needs (as Coke will not meet the needs of a Diet Pepsi drinker). The same
can be said for suppliers of goods who use the owner's mark to identify
the owner's goods for the purpose of comparison ("two Extra Strength
Bayer aspirin are as effective as Tylenol with Codeine and much less
expensive" 33), or description ("Bacardi Rum tastes great with Coke,"
"contains reconditioned and refurbished Titleist golf balls" 34). Daily
discourse similarly benefits from reference to brands, as this paragraph
illustrates, as does artistic expression (as Warhol's Campbell Soup can
paintings commented on then-prevailing artistic standards).
The benefits each of these free-riding users derives from the
owner's investment is external to the owner's revenue and cost calculus
33 http://www.bayeraspirin.com/pain/tylenol.htm.
34 Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(affirming district court's denial of preliminary injunction requested by holder of Titleist
trademark alleging trademark infringement and dilution by golf ball reconditioner).
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because the users do not pay for the benefits they obtain.35 Because the
trademark owner who creates these external benefits receives no
compensation for doing so, his or her incentive to create is limited to the
compensation he or she receives from the purchasing consumers who pay
a higher price that reflects the cost of trademarking activity. The lack of
full compensation potentially leads to a sub-optimal amount of benefit-
creating activity.
36
In the legal literature generally37  and in copyright law
specifically, 38 the inability to internalize external benefits is routinely
characterized as a market failure. Information provision, such as that
provided by trademarking activity, is an example of a type of good that
35 Economists recognize that external effects "exist when the activity of one party
benefits (damages) another party that does not pay (receive compensation) for the benefit
(damage)." GIFFORD & SANTONI, supra note 5, at 37.
36 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 411 (1988).
37 Consideration of external benefits and sub-optimal provision of goods appears in a
diverse cross-section of the legal literature. See, e.g., Scott Altman, A Theory of Child
Support, 17 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 173, 186 n.64 (2003) (considering whether
subsidies may adequately internalize internal benefits of producing children); Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Public Reason as a Public Good, 4 J. L. Soc'Y 217, 239 (2003)
(arguing that there may be insufficient incentive to adopt public reason as a social norm
because some of the benefits of doing so are external to the actor); Thomas A. Lambert,
Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An Informational Approach to
Workplace Safely Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1031 (2004) (attributing a failure of
employers to adopt cost-effective precaution to sub-optimal production of external-
benefit-producing information about available precautions).
31 See Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between
Land and Property, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 417, 467 (2005):
Ordinarily, propertization of resources is extolled for its ability to internalize
externalities; if a property owner can capture all external benefits created by the
resource, the owner is more likely to use the resource efficiently. When the
resource is non-rival, however, complete propertization may result not in the
capture of external benefits, but in their dissipation. The owner will typically
charge a positive price for the resource even though the marginal cost of
distributing another unit is zero, resulting in a deadweight loss. Avoiding this
loss serves as a foundation for the doctrinal limitations on copyright protection--
durational limits, fair use, and first sale among them.
See also Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet
Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 247 (2001) (considering the extent to which internalization of
externalities by giving Napster rights to prevent uncompensated file sharing is necessary
to prevent inefficiency); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to
Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997)
(arguing that fair use of copyrighted works produces external benefits and that should
inform the scope of fair use protection).
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may be undersupplied. The question for trademark law is what to do about
this potential "systematic informational deficiency."
3 9
III. INTERNALIZING COPYRIGHT AND PATENT EXTERNALITIES
Formal application of externality theory to intellectual property
law came in articles on copyright and patent law published in 200540 and
2007.41 These articles illustrate ways in which copyrighted and patented
works produce external benefits, argue that copyright and patent law
should not internalize all externalities, and illustrate how copyright and
patent law do not allow compensation for all external benefits. They
provide guidelines for balancing the beneficial effects of exclusive rights
with the beneficial effects of free access.
The authors of the two articles conclude that exclusive rights ought
to be limited to the extent necessary to provide incentives to engage in
creative activity. Part III.A describes the operational rules developed by
Professor Jeffrey Harrison, illustrates their application in the copyright
context, identifies the costs associated with the grant of exclusive rights,
and translates the theory into the trademark law context. Part III.B
interprets these operational rules in a supply and demand framework
developed by Professors Frischmann and Lemley, applies them to patent
law, and describes trademark law analogies. Part III.C discusses those
external effects that should not be internalized because they are irrelevant
to or at odds with relevant policy goals. In trademark law, rights
assignments that do not affect the incentive to engage in trademarking
activity, that increase search costs, or that harm competition are at odds
with trademark policy.
A. OPERATIONAL RULES
In a 2005 article, Professor Jeffrey Harrison used externality theory
to develop operational rules for copyright issues.42 The fundamental idea
is that copyright law awards the possibility of a financial reward to a
creative person in a manner designed to maximize benefit to society. 43 He
demonstrates this through the application of two related rules: (1) protect
works only when doing so creates more social benefits than costs and (2)
incur no greater social cost than necessary to provide incentives to the
39 The term "systematic information deficiency" is adopted from Professor Lambert's use
in an article about workplace safety and information about available precautions.
Lambert, supra note 37.
40 See Harrison, supra note 4.
41 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4.
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creator.44 These rules reflect the basic idea that, while creative work is to
be encouraged, "private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts."
45
While broad exclusive copyrights maximize the possibility of
reward, exclusive rights are costly. Costs include the administrative
expense of protecting copyrights, the transaction costs of negotiating for
access to protected works, and the deadweight loss associated with
exclusion of people unwilling to pay the price demanded.46 If the goal is to
maximize net social gains from creative activity, something less than
complete internalization of externalities is appropriate.
A scope of copyright that is too broad limits public access too
much. The challenge is to find the scope of rights that simultaneously
encourages creativity and external benefits - the optimal balance between
exclusive rights and public access. If an increase in creative activity
accompanying a larger scope of copyright is accompanied by even greater
increase in costs, the scope of rights should not be expanded.4 v For
example, expressive works with only modest creative content - those
with only a "modicum" of creativity - receive only thin copyright
protection. 48 The social cost of exclusive rights is tailored to match the
social benefit associated with the creative activity.
Translating to the trademark context, the basic idea is that
protection of a mark owner's investment in goodwill must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting competition and benefiting consumers. This is
achieved by expanding the scope of trademark rights (protecting goodwill)
only when doing so produces a net social benefit. The expected value of
increased information must be balanced against the associated costs of
denying access. The cost of increasing the scope of rights includes the
costs of registering and enforcing trademark rights, the transaction costs
associated with obtaining permission to use others' marks, and the harm to
referential users of marks from denying access. The challenge for




45 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
46 See Harrison, supra note 4, at 13-14.
47 See id. at 14.
48 See generally id. at 15 (interpreting Feist Publ'ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991)). "The notion of 'thin' in copyright law refers to the fact that works with little
creativity have only slight protection." Harrison, supra note 4, at 19.
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B. THE OPERATIONAL RULES IN A SUPPLY AND DEMAND FRAMEWORK.
In 2007 Professor Brett Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley argued
for balancing exclusive rights and public access using an externalities
approach to patent and copyright issues. 49 Their conclusion was that
complete internalization of externalities is not always necessary 50 and that
the social costs of relying on expanding the scope of copyright and patent
rights may exceed the benefits.51 With this conclusion, Frischmann and
Lemley provide support for Harrison's operational rule that it is desirable
"to protect only works that create more social benefit than social cost."
52
Frischmann and Lemley illustrate the balancing process by
reference to principles of copyright and patent law. For example, they
observe that copyright law does not protect ideas, themes, or facts. The
social costs of such protection, in terms of its "essential role in socially
valuable processes," 53 presumably exceed the benefits in terms of
additional incentives. Copyright's fair use provisions protect uses that
have such widespread social utility that, even if the social value of each
person's use of the copyrighted work is small, the cumulative value is
49 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 257 ("This new theory has significant potential
as an alternative economic theory to understand IP as well as other areas of the law.").
Taking the externalities approach may be strategic for two reasons. First, their previous
scholarship illustrates Frischmann and Lemley's intimate familiarity with applications of
public goods theory to intellectual property issues. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 23,
939-956; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 129-30 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 997 (1997); Mark A.
Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REv. 255, 268
(1997). And they are aware of the demand and supply side implications of the market
failure associated with public goods. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 23, at 939-56;
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REv. 479, 533 n.232 (1998). Second, it is very useful to look at old problems from
new perspectives. By recasting the public goods argument as an externalities argument,
Frischmann and Lemley make their appeal for limits on the scope of intellectual property
rights appear to be yet another argument while undoubtedly recognizing that creating
public goods by definition creates the potential for external benefits because of their non-
rivalrous character. See GIFFORD & SANTONI, supra note 5, at 37 ("Public goods create
what are called externalities."). Their "alternative economic theory," Frischmann &
Lemley, supra note 4, at 257, allows them to rephrase the public goods arguments in a
manner that might be more appealing to or understandable by some readers.
50 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 258 ("We suggest that there is no reason to
think that complete internalization of externalities is necessary to optimize incentives.").
51 Id. ("We observe that even where internalizing externalities increases incentives to
invest, the social costs of relying on property rights to do so still may exceed the
benefits.").
52 Harrison, supra note 4, at 6. The demand side argument is addressed to social benefits
and the supply side argument is addressed to social costs. See Frischmann & Lemley,
supra note 4, at 271.
53 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 286.
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great.5 4 Fair use analysis in copyright includes both social benefits of free
access and cost to the creator in terms of diminished incentives. 55 Fair use
is less likely to be allowed, other things equal, where the use is
commercial and detrimentally affects the creators' ability to earn
compensation,5 6 but both benefits and costs are balanced.
Their conclusion that full internalization is inappropriate has
supply-side and demand-side arguments. On the supply side, Frischmann
and Lemley argue that creators only need to be given "enough" incentive
and something less than full internalization may achieve that goal.5 7 The
argument reflects Harrison's operational rule that it is desirable to incur
"no greater social cost than necessary to encourage the production of
copyrighted work.,58 They argue that "society needs merely to give them
enough incentive to cover the fixed costs of creation that their imitators
will not face. 59 Additional compensation may produce no additional
investment in creation or may not promote innovation as much as if
others were free to adapt the creation to other uses, 61 even if licensees are
permitted to develop the creation.
62
On the demand side, Frischmann and Lemley start with the
generally recognized proposition that external benefits distort allocative
efficiency because creators do not take those benefits into account when
deciding how much to invest in creation.63 While competitive markets
generally reveal consumers' willingness and ability to pay for goods and
services, they do not reveal the full social value of the goods or services or
allow suppliers to obtain compensation equal to that full social value.
64
The full social value would deprive buyers of all consumer surplus: "If we
calibrate IP rights properly, the disparity between the incentive needed to
54 [d. at 288.
55 [d. at 289.
56 id.
57 Id. at 276. Frischmann and Lemley's argument has three parts: (1) the observation that
giving additional compensation to a particular innovator does not always encourage more
innovation because the present return on investment is sufficient, id. at 276-77; (2) that
competition rather than monopoly for development of a particular idea may be preferable,
id. at 277-78; and (3) that the option of licensing others to improve on or exploit the idea
may not lead to full internalization, id at 278-79.
5' Harrison, supra note 4, at 6.
59 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 276.
60 [d.
61 [d. at 277.
62 
[d. at 278.
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motivate research and the full social benefit of an innovation will show up
as spillovers."65 Consumer surplus is an example of such a spillover.66
In their discussion of patent law, Frischmann and Lemley discuss
the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to unforeseeable, later-
developed technologies. On the supply side, extending patent protection to
uses and developments the inventor could not have foreseen may not
promote innovation as much as if others are allowed to "tinker with or
repurpose ' 6y inventions. On the demand side, an innovator examining the
market for her invention may be unable to internalize the demand for
unforeseeable future uses and developments. Accordingly, patent law
should "balance the incremental incentive created by the prospect of a
broad right extending into unforeseen territory against the potential that
broad application of the doctrine will restrict improvers who cannot
effectively bargain for those rights." 68 The balancing process includes the
benefits from increased incentives and the benefits from access.
There are straightforward analogs to these market failures in
trademarks. On the supply side, giving greater incentives to produce
information through internalization may not yield the information
consumers desire - such as more information about the limitations of a
product's performance and the characteristics some consumers may
consider undesirable. 69 Nor will it produce advertising favorably
comparing a competitor's product to the mark owner's product or produce
information accurately describing a repaired or remanufactured item as
having originally been manufactured by the mark owner. The mark owner
is not in the best position to appreciate the social benefits of these uses and
probably would not license them if it had the option.
On the demand side, the ability of mark owners to determine the
demand for product and source information is limited. Purchasing
consumers reveal their demand for information by their willingness to pay
the cost of marketing that is included in their price. But other referential
users, including competitors engaged in fair use of the mark and
consumers who use the mark to reject particular goods do not reveal the
value they derive from the mark owner's investment.7 0 Thus, the general
65 d. at 283.
16 Consumer surplus is the difference between the maximum a buyer is willing and able
to pay and the price he or she actually pays. It measures the consumer's improvement in
well-being due to the purchase. DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN STOUT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 364-65 (1992).
6' Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 292.
68 Id.
69 See Barnes, supra note 9, at 58-59 (discussing failures in the market for trademark
information).
70 Barnes, supra note 9, at 53 et seq. Barnes concludes:
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balancing approach to the scope of copyright and patent applies to
trademark as well.
C. IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES
Much of the scholarly literature discussing the approach to
property rights and the internalization of externalities offered by Harrison,
Frischmann, and Lemley is based on a 1962 work by Professors Buchanan
and Stubblebine simply titled Externality.71 This literature distinguishes
between those "relevant" externalities that ought to be taken into account
in policy analysis and "irrelevant" externalities that ought to be
discounted.72 Irrelevant externalities are those external benefits that should
not be internalized.
Internalizing external benefits from the information embodied in
creative activity generally creates a deadweight loss. Granting exclusive
rights generally increases the creator's revenues and incentives to create.
But denying access generally causes a loss to people who could benefit
from the information already produced. Suppliers may deny access by
charging a price for information that additional consumers could have
consumed at no cost. The deadweight loss is a measure of the benefits
In sum, there are three market failures associated with trademarks. First is a
market failure created by non-excludability, free riding that interferes with the
ability to recoup costs, which is addressed by creating exclusive rights. Second,
there a market failure created by the static/dynamic dilemma, the deadweight
loss associated with excluding some would-be purchasers due to higher price
that includes costs of trademarking. This is unaddressed by trademark law, but
may be considered a worthy tradeoff for providing incentives to suppliers of
search information. Third, there is the market failure created by lack of demand
revelation, which is unaddressed by trademark law.
Id., at 62.
71 James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371
(1962) (cited in Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 276 n.68). Among others relying
on the Buchanan/Stubblebine conclusion in a variety of legal contexts are Susan Block-
Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 539 n.170
(2001); Steven J. Eagle, Environmental Amenities, Private Property, and Public Policy,
44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 425, 428-29 (2004); Fennell, supra note 23, at 942 n. 146; Lee
Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1068 n.130 (2006); Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization:
The Gap between Private Loss and Social Cost, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 589, 590 n.3
(1997); Haddock, supra note 23, at 383 ("[N]eglect of Buchanan and Stubblebine's
article Externality is as widespread among economists as among legal scholars,
biologists, environmental scientists, or politicians."); Kieff, supra note 23, at 366; Todd J.
Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in The Common Law: An
Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 988 n.91 (1996).
72 See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 71, at 380-8 1.
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consumers could have obtained had the supplier's price not excluded
them.
73
Intellectual property law accepts deadweight loss in order to create
incentives. Deadweight loss measures only losses from denied access. It
does not measure the harm to incentives of denying exclusive rights.
Externality theory and public goods theory recommend denying access
only to the extent justified by the creation of incentives. 74 For intellectual
property, an irrelevant externality is one that affects neither the supply of
desirable information nor the benefits of access.7 5 Relevant effects are
those that increase information and the benefits derived from creative
work.
This seemingly abstract theory applies directly to trademark
policy. Relevant externalities in trademark law are those that affect
trademark law's objectives. Trademark law is concerned with increasing
the supply of information about the sources and characteristics of products
and the benefits of access to that information. Exclusive trademark rights
encourage trademark owners to invest in the signaling power of their
marks. This signaling power is their goodwill. Signaling power is
analogous to exclusive copyrights and patent rights. Protecting goodwill
provides an incentive to increase the flow of accurate product and source
information. Exclusive intellectual property rights increase the flow of
information.
The ultimate objectives of protecting goodwill are to lower
consumers' costs of searching for satisfactory products 76 and to increase
7, See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 66, at 364-69.
74 See supra Parts III.A and B.
75 See Harrison, supra note 4, at 14 ("Put differently, as long as the creative effort is put
forward, there is no need to incur costs to protect benefits beyond this minimum. These
extra benefits ... are irrelevant to the author's decision-making."). Such externalities are
sometimes labeled merely "pecuniary" externalities as distinguished from
"technological" externalities that affect the benefits derived from the use of resources.
See Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good By Doing Nothing, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1287, 1294 n. 12 (2007) (citing Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy
Toward Pecuniary Externalities, 20 PUB. FIN. REv. 304, 304 (2001) ("Pecuniary
externalities create third-part effects through changes in relative prices or asset prices.
Unlike technological externalities, they do not misallocate resources and are necessary
for the market to work efficiently.").
76 See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002):
The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by
providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of
particular goods. The consumer who knows at a glance whose brand he is being
asked to buy knows whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and
whose product to buy in the future if the brand pleases. This in turn gives
producers an incentive to maintain high and uniform quality, since otherwise the
investment in their trademark may be lost as customers turn away in
disappointment from the brand. A successful brand, however, creates an
incentive in unsuccessful competitors to pass off their inferior brand as the
2007-2008
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competition. 77 This Article argues that externality theory and public goods
theory apply to trademark law as they do to copyright and patent. If so, we
would not protect goodwill for its own sake, but rather for the benefits
investment in product and source information gives to society.
Given those objectives, we would discount arguments for
internalization of uncompensated uses that increased consumers' search
costs or decreased competition. We would not expand the scope of rights
if the only effect is to give more compensation to trademark owners.78 If
internalizing an external benefit had no incentive effects or harmed
competition, we would be protecting goodwill for its own sake. Such an
externality is irrelevant and should be discounted in trademark policy.
Unauthorized uses of trademarks may create irrelevant or relevant
effects, as judged by the purposes of trademark law. Uncompensated use
of a mark by a competitor to describe his own goods - comparative
advertising 79 _ may diminish future revenue to the mark owner in two
ways. First, permitting uncompensated comparative advertising may
deprive the mark owner of revenue by diverting sales to a competitor's
goods that better satisfies consumers' needs. Second, permitting
uncompensated use denies licensing fees the owner could, hypothetically,
obtain from the competitor. But such an arguments for internalization
based on loss of revenue should be discounted.
Forbidding such use would neither generate additional incentives
nor promote competition. The first effect, diversion of sales, is desirable.
Comparative advertising reduces search costs. If a competitor better
satisfies consumers' needs, the competition enhances consumer welfare.
Internalizing the externality would be contrary to the ultimate goals of
trademark law.
The second effect, denying licensing opportunities in this case, is
unlikely to reduce trademarking activity. A mark owner is unlikely to
license use of its mark to a competitor for use in comparative advertising
disparaging the mark owner's product. While there may be licensing
successful brand by adopting a confusingly similar trademark, in effect
appropriating the goodwill created by the producer of the successful brand. The
traditional and still central concern of trademark law is to provide remedies
against this practice.
77 See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) ("Because
trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of product quality,
Congress determined that 'a sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive
nationally the greatest protection that can be given them."' (quoting S. Rep. No. 1333,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1946)).
71 One could, of course, offer moral arguments for increased compensation. As the
discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), indicates, that seems to fly in the face of the modern
understanding of the roots of intellectual property. See Part V.A infra (discussing the
rationale of International News); see also Breyer, supra note 21 (discussing and rejecting
moral arguments for intellectual property protection).
79 See supra text accompanying note 14.
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opportunities, the mark owner is unlikely to seize any of them.
Internalization would not increase licensing revenues.
On the other hand, unauthorized proprietary uses may have
relevant effects. Classic passing off increases the costs of finding a
particular trademark owner's goods. It misrepresents the qualities and
characteristics of the goods, at least the source information, and interferes
with competition on the merits. In classic passing off, the diversion of
trade prevents consumers from satisfying their needs. And the diversion
destroys the incentive to engage in trademarking activity. In both the
comparative fair use and the passing off cases, we would want to consider
whether the effect of internalization on creativity would, on balance,
increase or decrease the supply of search-cost reducing and competition-
enhancing information.
IV. EXTERNALITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS THEORY
The recent economic analysis of externalities in the intellectual
property context replicates the implications of public goods theory. Public
goods analysis is the traditional approach to copyright and patent law and
an emerging approach to trademark law issues. Creative expressions and
innovations have long been recognized as being non-rivalrous in their
consumption and non-excludable in their supply.80 These characteristics of
public goods mean, respectively, that information once created can be
simultaneously enjoyed by many people without interfering with the
benefits each derives8 1 and that it is difficult to exclude people from
enjoying those benefits.
8 2
A private individual's flower garden is often used as an example of
a public good that produces positive externalities. Each neighbor can
so See Barnes, supra note 9.
81 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8 (2d ed. 1996); P.A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public
Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. STATS. 332, 334 (1958) (discussing "public
goods," "which simultaneously enter into many persons' indifference curves"); P.A.
Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON.
& STATS. 350, 350 (1955) (stating that a "public consumption good ... differs from a
private consumption good in that each man's consumption of it, X 2 and X
2
2 respectively,
is related to the total X 2 by a condition of equality rather than of summation"); P.A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATS. 387, 387
(1954) (defining "collective consumption goods" as those "which all enjoy in common in
the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from
any other individual's consumption of that good").
S2 See GIFFORD & SANTONI, supra note 5, at 32 ("A characteristic of some public goods
(and some private goods) is that, once the good is produced, it is extremely costly to
prevent individuals from consuming the good."). Economists sometimes classify public
goods that are excludable as "club goods" and define public goods as those possessing
characteristics of both rivalry and non-excludability. See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER,
supra note 81, at 23.
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enjoy the flowers without diminishing the pleasures others obtain -
"consumption by one person does not deplete the view or beauty available
for others to consume." 83 Accordingly, there is no cost to letting passers-
by or neighboring homeowners gain external benefits.
Describing a "new economics of trademark" in 2006, Professor
Barnes noted the following implications of public goods theory for
trademark law:
Non-rivalry creates a static/dynamic dilemma. Charging
non-rivalrous users of a public good creates a deadweight
loss by excluding some users, but not charging them
diminishes suppliers' incentives to supply, potentially
creating a deadweight loss due to underprovision of the
good. By permitting unrestricted, free referential and
customary use, trademark law increases the non-rivalrous
use of search information, reducing but not eliminating the
deadweight loss associated with static inefficiency.
Non-excludability diminishes suppliers' incentives and
obscures users' demand for the good. Trademark law does
nothing to reveal the value many referential and customary
users place on search information so does little to ensure
that the optimal amount of search information is
provided. 84
This summary reveals two policy implications of characterizing
information as a public good. The first is expressed as a long-run or
dynamic allocative efficiency concern that there will be insufficient
market incentives to encourage the production of creative works and
innovations. If consumers cannot be excluded because of the high cost of
doing so, creators and innovators may not get enough incentive to produce
and there will be no market signal regarding the optimal quantity to
produce. This parallels the first two potential market failures one can
derive from externalities theory - failure of incentives and failure to reveal
demand. 86 These failures potentially arise if there is incomplete
internalization of positive externalities. These failures, taken alone,
suggest a policy of expanding trademark rights.
83 Frischmann, supra note 23, at 966.
84 Barnes, supra note 9, at 65.
85 Frischmann, supra note 23, at 947 (comparing static and dynamic efficiency and
concluding that "[t]aken together, these two perspectives - static and dynamic efficiency
- yield a complicated economic puzzle in terms of maximizing social welfare. As a
policy matter, it may be necessary to strike a balance between opening access to reap
static efficiency gains and restricting access to reap dynamic efficiency gains.").
86 See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
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Expanding trademark rights, however, potentially gives rise to
another potential market failure, which may be characterized as a short-
run or static allocative efficiency concern. 87 If creators and innovators can
charge those who benefit, some who could enjoy the benefits at no cost
will not have access. Non-rivalry means that, once produced, information
can be simultaneously and costlessly consumed by many. This potential
market failure, taken alone, suggests a policy of decreased propertization
of trademarks. The dynamic and static concerns conflict. Obviously, a
balancing of interests is required.
Copyright and patent policy recognize that the first market failure,
failure of incentives, cannot be met simply by full internalization because
that interferes with the static allocative efficiency concern, free access to
avoid deadweight loss. The result is a relatively short term for exclusive
patent rights, after which access is free, and restrictions on the scope of
copyright protection. These term and use restrictions attempt to balance
the dynamic and static concerns.
Because trademarks share the characteristics of providing external
benefits and may be characterized as mixed public goods, they share the
same potential for failures in the market for trademarking activity. Mixed
public goods are ones with both rivalrous and non-rivalrous uses 8 -
competing proprietary uses are rivalrous and referential uses are generally
non-rivalrous. A comparable policy analysis, with a balancing of dynamic
and static efficiency, is therefore appropriate whenever we consider a non-
rivalrous referential use. The challenge is to find the scope of rights that
simultaneously encourages creativity and permits access - the optimal
balance between exclusive rights and public access.
This is precisely the conclusion of the analysis of copyright and
patent based on spillovers and externalities. This parallel between the
analysis of externalities and of public goods should come as no surprise to
economists; public goods create external benefits.8 9 That is not to say that
the "spillovers" or "externalities" approach to intellectual property issues
is not useful. It is often extremely valuable to adopt a fresh perspective on
issues, as the recent work by Harrison, Frischmann, and Lemley
illustrates. Nevertheless, the bottom line from both approaches is that there
may be optimal provision of public goods without additional incentives
and not all external benefits should be internalized. 90 Professor F.H.
17 See id.
88 See Barnes, supra note 9, at 45-47 (arguing that trademarks are mixed public goods).
89 GIFFORD & SANTONI, supra note 5, at 37.
90 Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999), comes to the
same conclusion from a micro-economic/industrial organization perspective. Lunney
assumes there is free-riding (external benefits) and considers whether competitive and
monopolistic markets will supply an optimal level of output of goods subject to free-
riding. From the perspective of market structure, particularly the comparative structures
of markets throughout the economy, "the externality created by such conflicting uses [of
2007-2008
24
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/1
TRADEMARK EXTERNALITIES
Buckley summarizes the policy conclusion in both externality and public
goods terms: "Where my actions confer positive externalities, it does not
follow that I will undersupply the public goods unless others chip in....
What matters is whether, at the margin, public goods are undersupplied
and public bads oversupplied, and not whether there are third party
effects."
91
Although it has been recognized that trademarking activity creates
external benefits, 92 trademark policy is not customarily evaluated from
either an externalities or public goods perspective. Until recently, scholars
had denied that trademarks shared the public goods characteristics of
copyrighted expressions and patented innovations. 93 Scholars have
similarly not analyzed the scope of trademark rights from an externalities
perspective.
External benefits in patent and copyright are analogous to external
benefits in trademark. Patent externalities include benefits derived by
competitors who make money from making, using, or selling an invention
after the patent has expired, people who benefit from the more vibrant
economy innovation supports, industries in unrelated fields who benefit
from the ideas revealed with the innovation and others who learn from the
disclosure, and consumers whose benefit from new products exceeds the
prices they pay.94 Copyright externalities include benefits derived by those
who exploit a copyrighted work once it has entered the public domain,
creators who exploit unprotected elements of a work such as ideas,
trademarks] justifies government intervention only if disproportionate to the externalities
associated with other productive activities and only if so large as to eliminate a sufficient
incentive to create popular marks." Id. at 464. He dismisses the need to expand the scope
of trademark rights concluding that free riders are both desirable and necessary for
allocative efficiency. See id. at 442. His explanation is based on examination of the effect
of free-riding on the allocation of resources in competitive markets, id. at 446; the
necessity for correcting market failures in a competitive economy, id. at 447; the salutary
effect of free-riding in monopolistic markets, id. at 451; and the extent of the advantages
the supplier of a good susceptible to free-riding gets from being the first one in the
market to supply that good, id. at 452.
91 F.H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 133, 140-41 (2005).
92 For recent examples, see, for example, Manavinder S. Bains, The Search Engine
Economy's Achilles Heel? Addressing Online Parallel Imports Resulting from Keyword
and Metatag Misuse, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 6, 98 (2006) (listing minimization of
search costs, facilitation of economies of scale, and producer motivation to maintain
quality standards as positive externalities of trademark law); Matthew Ellman, Specificity
Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 234, 250 (2006)
(recognizing the external benefits trademark licenses create for other licensees when they
invest in the reputation of the trademark); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 10 COLUM. L. REV.
1029, 1059, 1061 (2006) (characterizing dilution law as a congressional attempt to
internalize to owners of famous marks the benefits others derive from that fame).
93 See Barnes, supra note 9 (arguing that trademarks are mixed public goods and that the
optimal provision of trademarks faces the same static/dynamic dilemma as the provision
of copyrighted works and patented innovations).
94 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 4, at 260-62.
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designers of products that allow consumers to enjoy copyrighted works
like DVD players and iPods, consumers who benefit from the works they
consume by being educated and socialized 95 (to the extent this benefit is
not captured in the price they pay), and those who engage in "fair use" of
the work during its period of protection. These benefits are typically not
internalized.
Part II of this Article identified the positive externalities associated
with trademarking activity. Those most obviously benefiting from a mark
owners' investment include competitors who pass off their goods as those
of the owner by using in a proprietary way a mark confusingly similar to
the owner's mark and consumers who use the owner's mark referentially
in searching for goods that satisfy their needs and buying those goods.
Some of these benefits are internalized, through infringement actions
resulting in payment of damages in the first case and through payment of a
higher price for the product in the second. Other referential users do not
pay: consumers who rely on the goodwill of the owner's mark (the
signaling power, the informational content) to reject the good; suppliers of
substitute or complementary goods who engage in comparative
advertising; and social commentators and artists whose expression is
enriched by reference to the owner's mark and those who benefit from that
expression. The question of the scope of trademark rights is a question of
which external benefits should be internalized.
V. EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
This Part describes the relationship between the externality and
public goods theories and the Supreme Court's misappropriation doctrine.
The discussion of misappropriation doctrine in Part V.A demonstrates how
the Supreme Court intuited the implications of externality and public
goods theory and arrived at a remedy consistent with those theories. Part
V.B recasts the operational rules described in Part III in a
misappropriation framework. These rules illustrate that the Supreme Court
misappropriation doctrine reflects the same underlying balancing process
derived from both externalities and public goods theory.
A. THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE.
Modern misappropriation doctrine is derived from International
News Service v. Associated Press.97 Compensation for external benefits
was the focus of the court's opinion. In that case, Associated Press (AP)
created internalized and external benefits by collecting news from England
during World War I. It received payments from newspaper publishers to
95Id. at 285.
9 6 Id. at 288.
97 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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whom it disseminated the news, 98 so some of the benefits from its efforts
were internalized. This compensation provided some incentive to engage
in the production of public goods, information to readers of the papers.
These benefits were internalized because the readers paid the publishers
for their copies of the papers.
AP also produced external benefits to free riders who benefited
from its production of a public good. Among those who free ride on the
publication of newspapers are those who learn the news from those who
do pay for and read the newspapers. Democratic society also presumably
benefits from a more informed citizenry. Free access to news is desirable.
An additional beneficiary of AP's investment was its competitor,
International News Service (INS). INS obtained the war news collected by
AP before it was published by the newspapers through a variety of
devices: bribing newspaper employees, inducing AP's clients/members to
send INS the news in violation of their agreements with AP, and copying
news from bulletin boards and early editions of AP's client/member
newspapers. 99 INS disseminated news thus acquired to its own paying
customers without any payment to AP.1°° Because distribution of news
and publication takes time, INS's customers had the news available for its
readers simultaneously with the service of competing AP newspapers.
1 1
AP complained about INS's free-riding through these various devices.
For the Supreme Court, the question turned on whether INS's
conduct was unfair competition. 102 In externality terms, it was a question
of whether the benefits from the particular use of the public good
produced by AP should be internalized. It did not depend on whether there
were property rights, but rather on the functioning of the business of
making news known to the world. 10 3 "The question of what is unfair
competition in business must be determined with particular reference to
the character and circumstances of the business."'
10 4
The Court focused on the external benefits created by AP and
exploited by INS. The Supreme Court stated that "he who has fairly paid
the price should have the beneficial use of the property."' ' 5 But the Court
was unconcerned with internalizing all of the positive externalities created
by the newspapers' publication of the news to the public. For instance,
"[lt]he right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of
98 Id. at 229.
99 1d. at 231.
100 Id. at 232.
101 Id. at 238.
102 Id. at 235.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 236.
105 Id. at 240.
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its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably
interfering with complainant's right to make merchandise of it, may be
admitted."'1 6 But what are the limits to free use? Which uses by others
should provide external benefits and which should be internalized?
The Court rejected INS's argument that AP abandoned the news to
public use when it disseminated the news to its members. Recognizing this
argument would "render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in
effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison
with the return."' 10 7 In other words, while free access might be desirable,
access must not be so free as to deprive the producer of public goods of
sufficient incentive to produce the goods. INS's conduct "amounts to an
unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant's
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped,
in order to divert a material portion of the profit from those who have
earned it to those who have not." 10 8 Accordingly, the Court declined to
modify the district court's injunction prohibiting this appropriation of the
news "until its commercial value as news to the complainant and all of its
members has passed away."'
10 9
It is instructive to note what the injunction prohibited and why. It
did not attempt to internalize all of the external benefits associated with
AP's investment. It did not prohibit competitors' use of the news content
after its immediate commercial value as hot news had passed. It even
approved of the benefit rival news gathers obtained from the leads ("tips")
provided by others new gathers. It only prohibited free-riding that would
prevent newsgathering by interfering "precisely at the point where profit is
to be reaped" by diverting a "material" portion of the profit from those
who have earned it to those who have not.
110
The concern with profitability of an enterprise that produces
external benefits is no surprise to analysts familiar with the economics of
externalities and public goods. The tradeoff is between dynamic and static
efficiency. In International News Service, this meant balancing the need to
encourage investment in creative activity by providing enough
compensation to ensure that the news was gathered and disseminated with
the need to encourage access to the fruit of the creative activity by
widespread dissemination of news. The external benefits of having an
informed populace could not conceivably be internalized to AP. The
question was where to draw the line.
The same question arises in trademark law. Expansions in
trademark protection based on goodwill are focused only on compensation
106 Id. at 239.
107 Id. at 241.
108 Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 245.
110 Id. at 242-45.
2007-2008
28
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/1
TRADEMARK EXTERNALITIES
to the creator - dynamic efficiency. How much compensation is
appropriate given the interest in static efficiency?
B. OPERATIONAL RULES REVISITED.
Combining the general theories of externalities and public goods
and the lessons of International News Service sheds light on modem
"trademark puzzles."111 Both economic theory and Supreme Court
reasoning support a five-step analytical approach to determining the scope
of intellectual property rights.
1. Did A create valuable information? This is the basic intellectual
property question of whether A has produced copyrightable or patentable
subject matter or used a mark that qualifies for protection.
2. Has another person benefited from use of that information
without compensation? This is the basic question of whether another
person is a free rider. Subsequent questions determine whether this
appropriation of another's creation is properly characterized as
misappropriation.
3. Effect on Incentives. Would permitting only compensated use
by this type of user motivate A to supply more information? This
addresses the dynamic efficiency concern from public goods theory.
Externality theory starts with the recognition that some internalization is
necessary to provide incentive to invest in creative activity. In trademark
terms, this means a social benefit in terms of more and better information
to reduce search costs and increase competition.
Public goods theory focuses on whether the type of use is one that
interferes with the benefits derived by others. Prohibiting some uses will
create no greater incentive for creative activity. The supply-side
perspective of externalities theory focuses on whether increased
internalization will produce the optimal level of investment in production
of information. The demand-side perspective considers the ability of the
creator of information to recognize the full extent of demand for that
information.
4. Benefits of Free Access. Would permitting only compensated
uses by this type of user interfere with other values? The relevant value for
trademark law is the production of accurate information that reduces
search costs and increases competition and consumer satisfaction with the
goods they purchase. Like the information fixed in tangible means of
expression and disclosed in patent applications, the source and product
characteristic information associated with a trademark can be consumed
by some users non-rivalrously and thus has the characteristics of a public
good.
... See Robert C. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REv. 2099
(2004) (listing policy issues currently facing trademark law and offering a model based
on the cost of enforcing trademark rights to explain the structure of the law).
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For all of intellectual property, free access means avoiding the
costs of protecting exclusive rights, which are saved if free access is
permitted. In the context of expanding trademark rights, these might
primarily be avoiding the cost of litigation. When the incentive effects of
internalization of benefits are slight, it makes little sense for society to
incur the costs of litigation.
5. Net Benefits from Internalization. Would the likely value
derived from an increase in the supply of information justify the
interference with other values? Public goods theory highlights the conflict
between the need to provide incentives, dynamic efficiency through
internalization of externalities, and static efficiency through maximizing
access to those whose consumption is non-rivalrous by permitting
uncompensated use. Externalities theory emphasizes the need to
internalize only sufficient benefits to optimize investment in the
production of information by protecting works only when doing so creates
more social benefits than costs and incurring no greater social cost than
necessary to provide incentives to the creator. A balancing of
considerations is inevitable. The optimal scope of trademark rights can be
analyzed by applying these rules. 112
VI. THE SCOPE OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS
The optimal scope of trademark rights depends on the incentive
effects of internalizing external benefits and the benefits of permitting
free-riding. Part VI.A applies the balancing test described in Part V.B to a
112 Commentators and courts frequently overlook this balancing. See, e.g., J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10.51 (4th ed.
2007):
A synthesis of the majority opinion in INS v. AP and the cases that have
followed that decision result in the conclusion that the following three elements
are necessary to plead and prove a case of misappropriation:
(1) Plaintiff has made a substantial investment of time, effort and
money into creating the thing misappropriated such the court can
characterize that "thing" as a kind of property right.
(2) Defendant has appropriated the 'thing at little or no cost, such that
the court can characterize defendant's actions as "reaping where it has
not sown."
(3) Defendant has injured plaintiff by the misappropriation.
Some courts identify the need for free-riding that creates a special competitive advantage,
though they do not specifically identify this as a balancing process. See Alcatel USA, Inc.
v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 788 (5th Cir. 1999) (listing the elements as "(i) the
creation by plaintiff of a product through extensive time, labor, skill and money; (ii) the
use of that product by defendant in competition with plaintiff, thereby giving the
defendant a special competitive advantage because he was burdened with little or none of
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classic trademark infringement case to illustrate the logic behind granting
exclusive rights to prevent competing proprietary uses. Part VI.B applies
the balancing test to the case of Internet initial interest confusion to
illustrate the considerations involved in deciding whether trademark law
should enjoin this use. Part VI.C extends the analysis briefly to
sponsorship and post-sale confusion. Among these areas on the edge of
trademark law, post-sale confusion presents the strongest case for
extending exclusive rights and Internet initial interest confusion presents
the weakest.
A. A CLASSIC TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASE: COMPETING
PROPRIETARY USE
Application of the operational rules derived from externality and
public goods theory and the misappropriation doctrine is relatively
straightforward in a typical infringement case. The classic case of
trademark infringement involves a competing supplier of goods using
another's mark to mislead consumers about the source of its goods. The
first two analytical steps, which demonstrate free-riding, are easily
managed. The owner has created information about the source and
characteristics of its products that is valuable to others, both competitors
and consumers. And the competing supplier has used that mark without
compensation to produce external benefits to itself. The remaining three
steps consider whether this competing proprietary use is appropriation or
misappropriation.
Effect on Incentives. Competing proprietary use discourages
investment in trademarking activity. Permitting only compensated use
enables suppliers of goods to ensure that only suppliers of goods
conforming to the owner's standards use the mark. This enables
consumers to rely on the mark owner's reputation (good or bad) for
supplying goods of consistent quality (high or low) and other
characteristics. If competing suppliers use the same mark proprietarily,
there is no assurance that the source or product information signaled by
the mark is accurate. Unable to create reliable signals, the mark owner's
incentive to invest in trademarking activities would be diminished. Even
would-be purchasers would be unwilling to compensate the trademark
owner for that activity. The infringer interferes with the mark owner's
investment exactly at the point where there is money to be made from the
trademarking activity.
Benefits of Free Access. Free access may enhance competitors'
revenues but only by injuring mark owners, consumers, and competition.
Permitting only compensated use interferes with competitors' ability to
divert consumers from the trademark owner's goods to its own - in short,
interferes with the competitor's ability to compete. Consumers benefit
from the presence of more competitors if greater competition enables
consumers to satisfy their needs better by (a) lowering prices, (b)
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increasing variety of product characteristics and qualities on the market, or
(c) otherwise making it easier for consumers to locate and obtain goods
that satisfy their needs for price, quality, and other characteristics.
Competing proprietary uses of a trademark may fare well by the
first desideratum. The infringing competitor can offer a lower price
because it does not have to bear the costs of trademarking activity.
Allowing uncompensated competitive proprietary use may enable
competing sellers to sell goods with characteristics different from those of
the mark owner's goods. Those competing goods might meet consumers'
needs better. Free-riding on another's mark may make entry into the
market easier. There might, then, be some benefits to free access by
competing proprietary users.
These benefits, however, are likely to be illusory. A greater variety
of goods is desirable only if consumers know what they are getting.
Confusing signals increase search costs. Because an infringement action is
based on likelihood of confusion at the point of sale, consumers are likely
to believe they are getting the mark owner's goods. The infringer's pro-
competitive argument is that they are deceiving consumers to benefit the
consumers. This would be a novel view of the competitive process. The
entry argument is also weak. One would expect a producer of more
pleasing goods to be more eager to differentiate itself by its own
trademarking activity. Of the purported benefits of free access by
competing proprietary users, then, we are left only with lower prices that
likely result in consumers unwittingly buying less satisfactory goods. It is
the essence of competition on the merits that consumers know the
price/quality dimensions of competing products.113
Net Benefits from Internalization. Passing off by using another's
trademark is not competition on the merits. This competing proprietary
use makes it more difficult for consumers to locate and obtain goods that
satisfy their needs. With little if any pro-competitive benefit sacrificed by
permitting only compensated competing proprietary use, the
overwhelming advantages of the increased supply of trademarking activity
are apparent, even given the costs of litigation necessary to enforce
exclusive rights.
B. INTERNET INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
Scholarly discussion of extending exclusive trademark rights by
prohibiting uses beyond the classic passing off context has been labeled
the "propertization" debate. 114 The propertization label has particular
113 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 10 (1998) (stating that for a market to be perfectly
competitive "producers and consumers [must] have complete information of all relevant
market factors").
114 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 23, at 1033, 1035 n.8; Michael Pulos, A Semiotic
Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 UCLA L. REV. 833, 833 (2006).
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resonance for externality theory. Externality theory is based on the idea
that internalizing external harms and benefits gives proper incentives for
those who develop property and invest in the creation of new property.
Recent extensions of externality theory to intellectual property are
concerned with the extent of internalization, with the extent of property
rights.
One of the most divisive issues in the propertization debate
involves initial interest confusion. 115 As in the classic case of passing off
using a trademark, initial interest confusion cases involve a creator of
intellectual property and a free rider. The creator is a trademark owner
who has invested to develop a well-known, even famous, mark. The free
rider is a competitor who has benefited without compensating the owner -
a free rider who reaps where he has not sown, the recipient of an external
benefit. But extending exclusive rights in the purest examples of these
free-riding cases would not not protect buyers from source confusion,
increase competition, directly affect incentives to provide information, or
increase the amount of desirable trademarking activity. Extending
exclusive rights would simply prevent free-riding. Comparative
advertising has the characteristics of these free-riding cases.
116
Initial interest confusion, sponsorship, and post-sale confusion
cases all have these characteristics to some extent: lower likelihood of
confusion, increased competition on the merits, less direct effect on
incentives, and no diminution of trademarking activity. The following
discussion focuses on initial interest confusion arising from Internet search
use of trademarks to illustrate the analysis that flows from externalities
theory, public goods theory, and misappropriation doctrine. Part VI.1
discusses a classic Internet initial interest confusion case, while Part VI.2
discusses variations on the classic case that may affect the balancing of
benefits and costs of extending exclusive rights. Part VI.3 briefly
considers how the balancing process works in sponsorship and post-sale
confusion cases.
1. A Classic Internet Initial Interest Confusion Case.
Among the scholars writing recently about treating trademarks as property are Stacy L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 783, 788, 800-01 (2004); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105,
112, 130 (2005); and Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, & the Structure of Trademark Law,
33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 606, 610, 616-17 (2004). For a list of earlier articles, see
Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: More Than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 35, 35 n.1.
115 See, e.g., Lisa M. Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine with the
Lanham Act, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 53, 60-73 (2003) (discussing the concept of
trademarks as property and the split among federal circuit courts on the treatment of
trademarks in the initial interest confusion context).
116 See supra text accompanying note 78.
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Initial interest confusion results when a party's conduct
temporarily confuses a computer user about who is the source of a product
or service marketed on the Internet. 117 Initial interest confusion is
distinguished from the typical point-of-sale confusion seen in traditional
trademark/passing off cases because the confusion is dispelled before the
consumer engages in a commercial transaction with the party. Because the
confusion is dispelled, the consumer is not deceived about who is
supplying the good or service he or she purchases.
Internet initial interest confusion typically arises from an advertiser
of goods or services paying an Internet search engine operator to display
its advertising or a link to its website in response to a computer user's
search inquiry. Better Metal, L.L.C. is a seller of parts used in the
construction of wireless telecommunications towers. 118 It paid Yahoo,
Inc., an Internet search engine operator, to list its website as a sponsored
link when a computer user searched for some combination of the
keywords "1," "pro," and "site. '119 Site Pro-i, Inc. is a direct competitor
of Better Metal. 120 Sponsored links appear at the top or on the side of the
search results pages in areas clearly marked "Sponsored Links." When the
computer user clicked on the Better Metal link, he or she was taken to the
Better Metal website, rather than to the Site Pro-I website, which was not
listed as a sponsored link, but was shown elsewhere on the search results
page.
This case is described as "initial interest confusion" because if the
consumer is confused about who is sponsoring the pop-up ad or website
link, that confusion is dispelled before any purchase is made. Once the
computer user clicks on the link, it is obvious that the website to which he
or she is sent is Better Metal. If the consumer is likely to believe that the
website is Site Pro-i, the confusion is not dispelled and that is regular
confusion.
All variations of Internet initial interest confusion cases involve an
investment of resources in trademarking activity by the trademark owner
and free-riding by the alleged infringer. The policy analysis then depends
on the balancing of the benefits from exclusive rights and free access in
this context.
Effect on Incentives. The potential dynamic inefficiency associated
with an advertiser's free access to another's mark is insufficient incentive
117 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir.
2004) ("Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest in a
competitor's product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest
confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is
therefore actionable trademark infringement.").
118 Site Pro-l, Inc. v. Better Metal, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-6508 (ILG) (RER), 2007 WL
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for trademarking activity by owners of marks. This potential inefficiency
is addressed by enjoining such uncompensated use. While it is difficult to
know whether there is insufficient incentive, it is possible to analyze
whether internalization will encourage more creativity.
Beneficial trademarking activity could result from enjoining
Internet initial interest confusion in two ways. First, the trademark owner
might obtain additional revenue by licensing its rivals or the search engine
provider and investing that revenue in producing valuable source or
product information. This beneficial effect is unlikely because trademark
owners would be reluctant to aid their competitors by licensing their
marks for this type of use.
Second, the grant of exclusive right might prevent mark owners'
loss of revenue to these competitors. The ads and links are designed to
inform customers of market alternatives and divert sales to the advertisers.
By prohibiting this information, trademark owners can maintain their
revenue, which would allow them to continue their present level of
trademarking activity. Or, by refusing to license, the owner might raise the
rival's costs of doing business by forcing the rival to find more costly or
less effective ways of attracting consumers. Raising a rival's costs is a
widely recognized way of obtaining competitive advantage. 12 1 This
suggests a beneficial effect on incentives from expanding exclusive rights.
But it would be contrary to trademark policy to increase incentives
by diminishing competition. Competition might be increased by Internet
advertising that alerts consumers to market substitutes. Raising rivals'
costs is generally considered anticompetitive.lZ2 Competition on the merits
improves consumer welfare by better providing competing goods
consumers prefer. As long as any confusion is dispelled by the time
consumers buy goods or services, as initial interest confusion assumes,
consumers may be presumed to have found the alternative goods at least
as desirable as the mark owners' goods. The loss of revenue to the
trademark owner is offset by an increase in revenue by the advertiser if
consumers are better able to find desirable goods. The beneficial effect of
expanding trademark rights to cover Internet initial interest confusion
therefore seems illusory.
Benefits of Free Access. The benefits from permitting this use of
trademarks as keywords are found in decreased consumer search costs and
increased competition. This conduct may both increase and decrease
search costs. In the Better Metal context, search costs are increased if a
computer user desiring Site Pro-i's website must scroll down past Better
Metal's sponsored ad or look around more carefully on the screen results
page to find Site Pro-i's website. Because reducing consumers' search
121 See G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals
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costs is one of the goals of trademark law, preventing this increase in
search costs is a benefit of recognizing exclusive rights.
Search costs might, however, be reduced for consumers who are
searching not just for Site Pro-i's product but for telecommunication
tower parts that best fit their requirements. Better Metal's conduct informs
consumers about a market substitute to Site Pro-i, about whom they
apparently are already aware, given their search strategy. Competition
would also be enhanced by the existence of a market substitute that better
satisfies consumers. The natural response to such competition would be to
try harder to meet consumers' demand by adjusting quality, variety, or
price.
Net Benefits from Internalization. The increase in search costs
from Internet initial interest confusion seems small. It only applies to
computer users trying to find a particular supplier, Site Pro-i in this
example. They must look more carefully on search results page for the
official website. Or they might open a link or click on an advertisement by
mistake. As long as the result is clearly not Site Pro-I (as long as there is
no confusion at the point of sale), they need merely to click back to the
search results page.
Any increase in search costs is offset by the benefits of being able
to find potentially superior competitive market substitutes. For computer
users looking for a particular supplier, the addition to search costs is small.
Sophisticated computer users are accustomed to skipping right over any
sponsored links that are inapplicable. The increase in search cost argument
does not apply at all to consumers who are trying to find a supplier whose
goods or services best fit their needs.
As long as consumers know with whom they are dealing when
they are reviewing a particular supplier's website, there seem to be only
competitive advantages from permitting this conduct. Any customers lost
to the mark owner will be those equally or better satisfied by the
competitor's product or those too lazy to compare products. It does not
seem desirable to protect the trademark owner's share of the lazy
consumers market given the potential improvement in competition.
Lastly, the traditional justification for the grant of exclusive rights
- protecting revenue to provide incentives for creating activity - does not
apply here. The low likelihood of licensing a mark to a competitor for this
purpose means there would not likely be increased revenue to devote to
trademarking activity. Any decline in revenue due to increased
competition on the merits is merely a transfer of wealth that can only be
prevented by obscuring market alternatives. Intellectual property
protection is not given for its own sake but rather to encourage the
production of useful information.
2. Variations on the Classic Case.
There are variations in the facts in Internet initial interest confusion
cases that might affect the policy balance. They would involve conduct
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that increased search costs, or decreased competition on the merits.
Factually, the content of results returned by the search engine is most
relevant. These factual differences might produce different legal results
and have different policy implications. 1
23
Several cases illustrate the policy implications of alternative
factual contexts. Hamzik owns the registered trademark "dating rings" for
rings and other jewelry. 124 Zales purchased the key word "dating rings"
from Internet search engines that displayed the result "Dating Rings -
Zales." By contrast, the Site Pro-i mark never appeared in conjunction
with the Better Metal names. The use in conjunction with the Zales mark
is more likely to cause confusion if it appears to the computer user that
Zales is the source of rings with the mark "Dating Rings." Any confusion
would increase the search cost of consumers seeking rings with the source
and quality properly indicated by the mark unless that confusion were
dispelled by its context.
Similarly, the longer it takes for the consumer to clarify the
confusion, the greater is the increase in search costs. In Brookfield
Communications, the Ninth Circuit offered an analogy to the competing
enterprise misleading consumers in a way that would more dramatically
increase search costs and decrease competition on the merits:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it
"Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a highway reading-
"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7"-where West
Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located
at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will
pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to
locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by
the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even
consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the
trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is
a Blockbuster right there.1
25
123 There are also different ways in which search engines receive instructions. Better
Metal illustrates the purchase of another's mark for use as a keyword. In a second
example, TheMSLonline.com used links and text on its website that was hidden from
viewers by appearing as white on white. Edina Realty, Inc. v. The MSLonline.com, 80
U.S.P.Q. 1039, 2006 WL 737064, at *2 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that this did not present a prima facie case of
trademark infringement). The links and texts included the phrase "Edina Realty," the
mark of the owner bringing suit. They caused TheMSLonline.com website to appear
higher on the list of results returned by the search for Edina Realty. In neither case was
the mark visible to the computer user except insofar as the user had entered it in the
search panel. These factual variations do not affect the analysis.
124 Hamzik v. Zale Corp., N.D.N.Y., No. 3:06-cv-1300 (May 19, 2007).
125 Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. Westcoast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir.
1999). The court concluded:
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The reason the Blockbuster example is compelling is that it raises the costs
of those consumers who were lured to the competitor. Imagine seeing a
sign raising one's hope that a Starbucks coffee can be found by exiting the
turnpike and being faced with costs of either getting back on the highway
or drinking a less satisfying coffee. This is not competition on the merits.
Some likelihood of confusion might not be enough to justify
enjoining the use. As the Supreme Court instructed in a 2004 trademark
fair use case, some confusion is tolerable in fair use cases where
commercially justified to support the advantages of increased
competition. 126 It is, therefore, consistent with the law to consider a
balance between competing policy objectives.
Thus, the more likely the consumer is to be confused about the
source of goods while shopping or purchasing, the more likely the conduct
interferes with the competition on the merits. Lencore Acoustics
Corporation, a manufacturer of sound masking-equipment, 127 used a
rival's SCAMP trademark in its metatags 128 to attract consumers to its
website.129 The website offered equipment with names "LM4" and "LM6"
Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that they
are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that
Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless,
the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill.
Id.
126 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004)
(holding that the defendant claiming a fair use defense in a trademark infringement case
need not prove the total absence of confusion). The Court opened the door to balancing
the potential for confusion with other concerns:
[T]he proceedings in this case so far raise no occasion to evaluate some other
concerns that courts might pick as relevant, quite apart from attention to
confusion. The Restatement raises possibilities like commercial justification and
the strength of the plaintiffs mark. As to them, it is enough to say here that the
door is not closed.
Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
127 Sound masking is a process by which background sound levels are controlled so as to
render ambient speech unintelligible to persons beyond the range of face-to-face
conversation. The process is particularly useful in reducing the perceived noise level of
open office space. 777388 Ontario Ltd. v. Lencore Acoustics Corp., 105 F.Supp.2d 56,
58 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
128 A "metatag" is a sequence of computer code written in Hypertext Markup Language.
As the Ninth Circuit described them, metatags may generally be distinguished between
"description" and "keyword" metatags. The description metatags are intended to describe
the web site; the keyword metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords relating to the
contents of the web site. The more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of
the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be 'hit' in a search for that
keyword and the higher on the list of 'hits' the web page will appear. Brookfield, 174
F.3d at 1045.
129 Ontario, 105 F.Supp.2d at 59.
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similar to the plaintiffs marks, "PLM4" and "PLM6."' 3 ° The case is
appealing as an example of infringement because the website itself
contains information likely to cause point of sale confusion, which raises
search costs and is not competition on the merits.
A fact that is irrelevant to the balancing process is whether the
advertiser paid the search engine provider for use of a specific trademark.
Google sold a competing online advertiser the use of the trademark
"American Blind," a trademark owned by American Blind and Wallpaper
Factory, Inc., for use in generating a sponsored link.131 The court found
that the sale of use of the mark by a search engine provider was a
sufficient use to support a trademark infringement claim. However, the
federal courts differ on this conclusion.132 While Google's sale is certainly
free-riding in the sense of being an uncompensated use of another's
trademark, the mere existence of external benefits does not mean that they
should be internalized. Static efficiency (access) as well as dynamic
efficiency (incentive) concerns should both be addressed.
C. SPONSORSHIP AND POST-SALE CONFUSION
The wide variety of possible proprietary and referential uses of
trademarks necessitates careful consideration of the scope of exclusive
rights. No one would consider denying consumers the right to use
trademarks to order goods. No one would permit competitors' use of
another's mark to defraud consumers. Between these extremes lies a
variety of cases including comparative advertising and initial interest
confusion. Each use has a different potential for affecting incentives,
13
1 Id. at 63.
131 Google, Inc. v. American Blind and Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340JF (RS),
2007 WL 159950, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
132 Compare 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (D.N.J.
2006) (by selling the right to have another's mark trigger a sponsored link, the search
engine provider "trades on the value of the mark") with Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan
Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005):
A company's internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not
communicate it to the public is analogous to an individual's private thoughts
about a trademark. Such conduct simply does not violate the Lanham Act, which
is concerned with the use of trademarks in connection with the sale of goods or
services in a manner likely to lead to consumer confusion as to the source of
such goods or services.
At least one state has expressly made Internet initial interest confusion illegal by statute.
In 2007, the Utah legislature amended the Utah trademark statute to create a right of a
registered electronic trademark owner to enjoin use of a mark registered in the state's
new electronic registration system "to cause the delivery or display of an advertisement
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search costs, and competition. Whether the benefits of a particular use
should be internalized depends on a balancing of those effects.
Application of the operational rules to sponsorship and post-sale
confusion may give different results. Sponsorship confusion arises from
consumers' mistaken belief that the seller was "in some way related to, or
connected or affiliated with, or sponsored by," the mark owner. 133 One
such use that has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention is the sale of
clothing with the marks of athletic teams attached. 134 In some contexts, the
use of the mark is such as to make consumers believe the source of the
product is the team. These cases cause routine point-of-sale confusion,
much like Internet use of another's mark in the advertisement or on the
website of the advertiser. 
135
More interesting analytically are circumstances that make it clear
that the supplier of goods is not associated with the mark owner in any
way.136 Courts have held in this context that confusion means not only the
source of the goods, but the source of the trademarked symbol. 137 If a cap
with the Boston Red Sox logo is sold with a clear indication that the
source is not the Boston Red Sox, the effect of the use is more like Internet
initial interest confusion than point of sale confusion. Even if consumers
are not confused about the source of the goods, the user is gaining
advantage from the goodwill of the Red Sox.
138
133 Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1984).
134 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993); see
also Bone, supra note 111, at 2144, concluding:
[T]here is little in the way of trademark-related harm in merchandising cases,
and the substantive policies favoring trademark protection are not strongly
implicated. Moreover, there is no strong enforcement cost rationale for
extending protection as far as courts do. The "propertization" critics are correct
that many of these cases reflect problematic expansions of trademark law.
Id. at 2155.
135 See supra text accompanying note 123.
136 See Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676
F.2d 1079, 1083 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding no infringement where there was no history of
affiliation between fraternal organizations and jewelry makers bearing their marks and
clear advertising distinguishing the "official supplier" from others).
137 Boston Pro. Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. 510 F.2d 1004, 1012
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975):
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant
duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the
public would identify them as being the teams' trademarks. The certain
knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. The argument that
confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is
unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering
mechanism for the sale of the emblem.
138 See Kozinski, supra note 134, at 976-77:
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Externality theory, public goods theory, and the misappropriation
doctrine recommend analysis of the effect of this use on the team's
incentives, consumer search costs, and competition. It might be that some
activities rely on sale of articles showing affiliation with groups for
essential support, diminishing incentives, while others do not. This
conduct might make it much harder for those who want authentic team
clothing to find it. If so, the conduct would raise search costs more than in
the initial interest confusion example, though labeling could easily cure
the problem. Because a team is more likely to license use of its mark on
clothing, greater increase in compensation is likely to result from
internalizing this externality. On the other hand, if there are more suppliers
of team paraphernalia, competition is likely to lower prices and provide
more variety of styles and quality. The differences between this type of
sponsorship confusion and initial interest confusion may make a more
compelling case for granting exclusive rights.
Perhaps an even more compelling case can be made for post-sale
confusion. In post-sale confusion cases, the immediate buyer is not
confused about the source of (often) counterfeit goods, but prospective
buyers and/or the general public are likely to be confused. 139 Numerous
harms may result from this type of use even if there is no confusion to
buyers.140 If the good, such as an designer handbag or watch, is a prestige
good or scarce, competition by counterfeits might diminish the value to
the buyers of real goods, 14 1 harming consumers and decreasing revenues
to the trademark holder through competition that cannot be described as
[Y]ou would have a strong claim to stencil your own Mets shirt or to make a
banner praising the Mets-or burying them-to hang from your window on Central
Park West. It's only a small step from there to say you ought to be able to pay
someone to stencil the shirt or banner professionally. The other interests I've
discussed would certainly also come into play, but the public's right to use the
team's name, logo, and other images to express itself must be given a wide berth.
139 See David M. Tichane, The Maturing Trademark Doctrine of Post-Sales Confusion,
85 TRADEMARK REP. 399 (1995) (discussing the history, development, and application of
the doctrine and recommending its application to protect the goodwill of trademark
owners). Compare Anne M. McCarthy, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why the
General Public Should be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3337, 3368 (1999) (concluding that point of sale confusion is irrelevant:
"Confusion of any kind is a form of 'trespass' against the owner because his effort in
developing an association with the mark is thwarted. Because any instance of confusion
jeopardizes the goodwill cultivated by a trademark owner, confusion is contrary to the
main tenets of trademark law.") with David Erlich, When Should Post-Sale Confusion
Prevent Use or Registration of Marks?, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 283 (1991)
(recommending "a sliding scale in which the number of confused persons, the type and
degree of confusion involved and the relationship of the confused persons to the parties
are all considered").
140 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006)
(listing harms associated with post-sale confusion).
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being on the merits. Consumers desiring high quality goods may be
harmed if the trademark owner must lower quality to be able to compete
with counterfeit goods. 142 And the trademark owners' reputation for
quality may be damaged if people other than the buyer mistakenly confuse
an inferior counterfeit for the original. As a result, consumers may shun
the mark owner's product line generally. 143 This harm might result even if
the counterfeit is originally sold with clear notices about its origin. 144 This
collection of possible harms may similarly be organized into effects on
incentives, consumer search costs, and competition. Decreasing the value
of advertising and the investment in quality directly affect incentives and
prevent competition from satisfying consumers needs.
CONCLUSION
Externalities theory, public goods theory, and misappropriation
theory all suggest a focus on both the incentives created by exclusive
rights to intellectual property and benefits from free access. The
operational rules from each approach are analogous. Externalities theory
suggests that we protect works only when doing so creates more social
benefits than costs. That is accomplished by incurring no greater social
cost (by denying access and enforcing rights) than necessary to provide
incentives to the creator (by internalizing external benefits). Public goods
theory suggests promoting static efficiency consistent with maintaining
dynamic efficiency. That is accomplished by permitting free access
(denying exclusive rights) to the maximum extent consistent with
providing optimal incentives (granting exclusive rights). Misappropriation
theory protects free access to information until the point where access
interferes with the profit-making necessary to provide incentives to
produce the information. All point in the direction of a balancing of the
same interests.
In trademark law, those interests are the creation of incentives to
engage in trademarking activity and the use of marks to lower search costs
and increase competition. Balancing these interests for any type of use of a
mark requires weighing the benefits of exclusive rights and the benefits of
free access. For Internet initial interest confusion cases, internalizing
external benefits from free access is unlikely to increase the amount of
product and source information. While initial interest confusion may raise
search costs slightly in some cases, it also promotes competition. On
balance, it seems appropriate to permit competitors to free ride on
trademark owners' investments.
While the argument in this Article is based on theory, courts have
relied on the same balancing considerations in trademark cases: incentives,
142 See U.S. v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1987).
143 Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244 (5th Cir. 1991).
144 See Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1353.
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investment in goodwill, search costs, and competition. The very idea of
trademarks is that they "lower consumer search costs and encourage
higher quality production by discouraging free-riders."' 145 "Trademarks
desirably promote competition." 146 Trademarks are property rights but
only in the sense that they are free from "unwarranted interference by
others."'
147
The question is what interference is warranted. "Buyers who have
reasonable alternatives to a particular seller's product are entitled to
competition within the industry because 'such competition may lead to
lower prices and improved quality."' 148 When protection of a mark "would
impede rather than promote competition and consumer welfare, an
exception should be recognized."
149
Courts that enjoin conduct leading to initial interest confusion tend
to focus solely on goodwill, the dynamic efficiency side of the equation.
They say that when consumers are diverted to another's website, the
Internet advertiser "reaps the goodwill" of the trademark owner and the
fact that consumers "are only briefly confused is of little or no
consequence."' 150 They conclude that what is important is not the duration
of confusion but the misappropriation of goodwill.' 5' The problem, they
145 Union Nat. Bank of Texas, Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat. Bank of Texas, 909 F.2d 839,
844 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987)).
146 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985); see also
Enterprises Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) ("To protect trademarks ... is to promote competition, and is sound public
policy."); David W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use: Confusion about
Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 838 (2004):
Protecting goodwill also promotes competition. A new entrant to a market can
use their own distinctive marks to establish brand recognition as well as a
reputation for providing goods with reliable qualities and characteristics. By
informing consumers about alternatives, new entrants use marks and establish
goodwill to compete against existing suppliers to satisfy consumer demands.
147 Barnes & Laky, supra note 146 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 413 (1915) (emphasis added)).
148 Id. at 838-39 (citing an antitrust case, United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 425 (1954)):
Ultimately, the benefit of protecting mark owners' goodwill is to consumers, who
may rely on the qualities and characteristics of the supplier's goods conveyed
through the mark and appreciate the advantages of vigorous competition. This lowers
prices and increases available alternatives to satisfy consumers' diverse tastes. This
reliance reduces consumers' cost of seeking information about goods, including not
just reading labels, advertising, and literature, but acquiring experience by buying
and rejecting unsuitable goods.
141 Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989 (7th Cir. 2004).
150 Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002).
151 See id. at 813.
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say, is that the advertiser is "capitalizing on the trademark holder's
goodwill." 152 It is a "violation of the Lanham Act," they say, to "use the
goodwill associated with Plaintiffs trademark in such a way that
consumers might be lured to the [products] from Plaintiffs
competitors."'
153
Courts accepting claims of Internet initial interest confusion offer
no limits on internalization of externalities and ignore balancing. In the
fair use context, the Supreme Court has opened the door to considering the
balance of other interests against the potential for likelihood of confusion.
The mixed public goods nature of trademarks means that that the balance
between incentives and access might differ for different uses of
trademarks. The discussion of Internet initial interest confusion,
sponsorship confusion, and post-sale confusion illustrate how to perform
this balancing.
There are two intriguing aspects of evolving theories of copyright
and patent law. The first is how well they mesh with more traditional
theories. Externality theory from 2005 and 2007 recapitulates public goods
theory applied to intellectual property in the 1980s. 154 Misappropriation
doctrine from 1918 embodies the prescriptions of theory developed
decades later. The second is how theory developed for copyright and
patent law, the creativity domain of intellectual property law, applies to
trademark law, the fraud domain. The three approaches to determining the
optimal scope of copyright and patent protection are equally useful in
analyzing trademark issues.
152 Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006).
153 Id.
154 See Gordon, supra note 11, at 1610.
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